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GUBERNATORIAL AGENDA 
SETTING AND DIVIDED 
GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH 
Laura van Assendelft, Mary Baldwin College 
Since World War II, party control of the Presidency , the 
Senate, and the House has been divided a total of 28 years. Despite the 
magnitude and persistence of this phenomenon, there is little agreement 
among researcher s about the impact of divided government on the 
American political system. Ginsberg and Shefter argue that divided 
government at the national level .produces institutional warfare . Each 
party attempts to strengthen the institution it commands and to weaken 
the institution controlled by the opposition. 
This political pattern undermines the governing capacities 
of the nation' s institutions, diminishing the ability of 
America 's government to manage domestic and foreign 
affairs, and contributing to the erosion of the nation's 
international political and economic standing. 1 
On the other hand , Mayhew argues that party control of the presidency 
and Congress does not really matter, because , in the end, just as much 
tnajor legislation is passed under divided or unified government. 2 
In attempting to solve this puzzle, this study will examine 
divided government from a new perspective. The studies by Ginsberg 
and Sbefter and Mayhew are focused on the president and Congress. 
But the phenomenon of divided government also occurs in the states. 
Over the last five decades , divided government has increased at the 
state level to where it bas become the norm. 3 Whereas in 1946 
divided government occurred in fewer than 15 % of the states , today 30 
states have divided government. This study turns to governors and 
state legislatures for additional clues. Perhaps more general forces are 
at work and theories at the national level may be expanded to explain 
similar patterns found at the state level. 
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Prior research has also focused on the impact of divided 
government on legislative outcomes. This study begins with a brief 
review of the methods and results of previous research, while testing 
similar hypotheses at the state level. However, quantitative measures 
of legislative outcomes, such as the number of bills passed, may 
obscure the real impact of divided government. In order to look more 
closely at the impact of divided government, this study will look further 
back in the policy process to agenda setting. Through the use of 
in-depth interviews with governors, legislators, and staff members in 
four case studies, perhaps the impact of divided government will 
become more visible. 
The states selected for analysis are Georgia, Tennessee, 
Mississippi, and South Carolina. Table 1 summarizes tµe main 
differences between the four states. The four cases were selected to 
Table 1: Party Control and Gubernatorial Experience in the Selected Case Studies 
State Governor Party Control Governor's Experience 
Georgia Zell Miller (D) unified professional politician 
(elected 1990) 
Tennessee Ned McWherter (D) unified professional politician 
(elected 1986) 
Mississippi Kirk Fordice (R) divided amateur politician 
(elected 1991) 
South Carolina Carroll Campbell (R) divided professional politician 
( elected 1986) 
Source : Almanac of Amer ican Politics, 1994. 
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allow comparisons between the prior political experience of governors 
and political party control, while holding constant as many additional 
factors that affect policymaking as possible. The analysis includes two 
states with divided government versus two states with unified 
government, as well as an amateur governor versus three professional 
governors . In addition, all four states are located in the South and are 
comparable in terms of socioeconomic factors, gubernatorial powers, 
and legislative professionalism. 4 
The distinction between amateurs and professionals is 
important because amateurs tend to have different motivations for 
public service, and, as a result, tend to use different strategies while in 
office. An amateur is defined as one who has little or no prior political 
experience. While Zell Miller (D-GA), Ned McWherter (D-TN), and 
Carroll Campbell (R-SC) have each made a career out of politics, Kirk 
Fordice (R-MS) was elected to office with virtually no prior political 
experience. 5 The prior experience of the governors also influences 
their style of leadership. Rosenthal describes governors as "legislative" 
or "executive" in nature. 
Governors of the former type speak the language of the 
legislature, emphasizing one-on-one dealings, personal 
relationships, and the building of consensus. Governors of 
the latter type speak a different language. They remain 
more aloof from day-to-day workings of the legislature; 
personal relationships count less for them; and they are 
more inclined to stand up for principle and take a 
confrontational approach . 6 
The type of experience governors have should help to explain whether 
governors are executive or legislative in nature . 
The underlying assumption of this study is that divided 
government has an impact on the strategies of agenda setting used by 
governors. In divided government, a governor does not have the same 
resources, such as party support, that a governor under unified 
government has as an advantage. According to Light's study of 
presidential agenda setting, party support in Congress is the most 
critical factor in agenda setting because it is a resource that does not 
decline as rapidly as public support over the course of a president's 
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term in office. When the president represents the majority party, even 
when he is down in the polls, there is still a base of party support to 
count on. According to Light, "Though congressional support does not 
guarantee victories on crucial votes, the president and the staff certainly 
believe that such support is a more consistent advantage than is public 
approval. "7 Public approval and the size of the president's electoral 
margin certainly strengthen or weaken the president's capital, but party 
support remains the critical factor. 
Call it push, pull, punch, juice, power, or clout, they all 
mean the same thing. The most basic and most important 
of all presidential resources is capital. .. And capital is 
directly linked to the congressional parties . While there is 
little question that bargaining skills can affect both the 
composition and success of the domestic agenda, without 
the necessary party support, no amount of expertise or 
charm can make a difference. 8 
If Light's theory applies to governors as well as presidents, 
then the governor under divided government will develop a different 
agenda setting strategy from the governor under unified government. 
Under unified government, a governor can make a partisan appeal for 
his agenda and primarily work inside the system, provided his party 
maintains a majority within the legislature. The strategy has potential 
for success as long as the governor does not split his party support by 
stressing controversial issues. Lacking party support as a potential 
resource, a governor working under divided government must develop 
an alternative strategy, such as going public. As long as the governor 
can maintain popular support, his agenda will have a kind of legitimacy 
that as a governor of the opposite political party of the legislature he 
would not ordinarily have . 
There are dangers, however, associated with a going public 
strategy of leadership . In his study of presidential leadership strategies, 
Kernell argues that going public is incompatible with bargaining. 
Kernell explains that in going public, issues are oversimplified, 
legislators are essentially threatened, little room is left for 
compromising, and "the legitimacy of other politicians" is 
undermined. 9 In contrast, Rosenthal argues that governors often go 
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public in order to facilitate bargaining with the legislature. 10 In the 
end, the governor's goal is to influence the legislature; the extent to 
which be is confrontational reflects his personality. This study will 
examine the styles and strategies of gubernatorial agenda setting in an 
attempt to see if divided government influences a governor's decision 
to primarily go public or work inside the legislative system. 
Quantitative Measures of Divided Government 
Researchers have made numerous attempts to measure 
quantitatively the impact of divided government. Studies have focused 
on the impact of divided government on nominations, treaties, the 
occurrence of high publicity investigations, and the use of vetoes. 11 
Divided government was found to have little or no impact, except in 
the case of the executive veto. The problem that arises with analyzing 
vetoes, however, is that the number of times a veto is threatened is not 
included. In some cases, it is only necessary to threaten a veto for an 
executive to influence legislation. Therefore, the number of actual 
vetoes is an incomplete measure of the extent to which the veto power 
is exercised. 
Other studies have explored the impact of divided government 
on legislative productivity. 12 If divided government produces 
gridlock, then it is reasonable to expect that fewer bills would be 
passed under divided government than under unified government. 
Using a rigorous methodology of both contemporary and retrospective 
evidence, David Mayhew identified 267 major laws and found that just 
as many important laws are passed under divided government (12.8 per 
segment) as under unified government (11. 7 per segment). "What does 
not emerge .. .is any relation worth crediting between the incidence of 
important laws and whether party control was unified or divided." 13 
Kelly reexamined Mayhew's data and reduced the sample of 
legislation analyzed to only those policies considered both timely and 
enduring. Kelly found that divided government does matter. While an 
average 8.8 innovative laws passed under unified government, an 
average of 6.09 passed under divided government. According to 
Kelly's analysis, "about 30% fewer innovative policies are passed in 
Congress under divided government than under a united one. "14 
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Two problems are raised in relying on legislative productivity as a 
measure of the impact of divided government. First, it is difficult to 
determine what is important or innovative legislation; different 
researchers have based their findings on different samples. Second, 
comparisons of legislative outputs have not explored how the demand 
for legislation varies over time. In attempting to address these 
problems, this study measured the legislative output of different state 
legislatures at the same point in time. The advantage of conducting 
research at the state level is that unified and divided government may 
be compared at the same point in time. Due to difficulties in obtaining 
information on large quantities of bills across states, however, the 
analysis includes the total number of bills passed without identifying 
important or innovative legislation. 
Table 2 shows the legislative productivity of divided and 
unified government across states from 1990-1991. States with divided 
Table 2: Legislative Productivity by Divided or Unified 
Government in the States, 1990-1991 
1990 
Unified Government {20 states) 
Average Number of Bills Introduced 
Average Number of Bills Enacted 
%Enacted 
Divided Government (29 states) 
Average Number of Bills Introduced 
Average Number of Bills Enacted 
%Enacted 
2212.0 
481.0 
30.9 
2280.0 
415.8 
31.4 
2048.4 
569.2 
34 .7 
2475.4 
437.6 
23.8 
2130.2 
525.l 
32.8 
2377.7 
426.7 
27.6 
Source: Book of the States, 199 2-1993 Edi ti 011. Lexington, Kentucky : Council of State 
Governments and The A lmanac of American Politics, 1990. Washington, D.C. : National Journal. 
Note : The data includes regular sessions only. Nebraska is not included (nonpartisan legislature). 
The nwnber of bills introduced is the combined total of both chambers of the state legislature . 
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government produced an average of 19 % fewer bills than states with 
unified government. However, in terms of the number of bills passed 
as a percentage of the number of bills introduced, the difference was 
only 0.5% in 1990 and approximately 11 % in 1991. There appears to 
be no consistent pattern suggesting an impact of divided government on 
legislative productivity at the state level. 
An analysis of legislative productivity in the four states 
selected as case studies from 1945-1993 produced similar findings. As 
shown in Table 3, the number of bills passed during divided 
government was significantly less than during unified government in 
two states, Tennessee and Mississippi. However, more legislation was 
produced during divided government than during unified government 
in South Carolina. (Georgia has only experienced unified government). 
Table 3: The Average Number of Bills Passed Per Year During 
Divided and Unified Government By State, 1946-1992 
Unified Government Divided .Government 
Georgia 609 
[45) [O] 
Tenne ssee 358 449 
[33) [12) 
Mississi ppi 552 605 
[43) [2] 
South Carolina 632 404 
[35) [10) 
Averag e 537.75 364.50 
0 Number of Years 
Source: The Book of the States, 1945-1993 Editions . Lexington, Kentucky: 
Council of State Governments. 
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A closer examination of the data demonstrated that when the 
period of divided government occurred explained why these patterns 
occurred. As illustrated in Figure 1, legislative productivity has 
gradually increased over time in Georgia and Tennessee, whereas in 
Mississippi and South Carolina, legislative productivity reached a peak 
in the 1970s, dropped significantly, and then leveled out. The trends 
in legislative productivity in each state have developed irrespective of 
divided or unified government. 
An analysis of vetoes at the state level also produced 
inconsistent results . As Table 4 shows, governors in states with unified 
government vetoed 25 % fewer bills than governors in states with 
unified government in 1990. However, in 1991, governors in states 
with unified government vetoed 11 % more bills than governors in states 
with divided government. In a comparison of the four govern ors 
selected as case studies, the two governors from divided governm ent 
states, Ford.ice (R-MS) and Campbell (R-SC), vetoed an average of 
17 % more bills than the governors from unified government states, 
Miller (D-GA) and McWherter (D-TN). 
Quantitative measures of legislative outcomes are proble matic 
in determining whether or not divided government has an impact 
because they do not take into account the numerous factors that have 
influenced policymaking at different stages in the process. To explore 
the process more closely, this study has used a qualitative approach 
focused on agenda setting, the earliest formal stage of the policym aking 
process. How agenda setting takes place defines the opportunities for 
success in terms of legislative outcomes. The analysis of agenda 
setting reveals patterns of an impact of divided government on the 
strategies that governors use. 
Gubernatorial Agenda Setting and Divided Government 
In each of the four case studies, the following factors were 
examined: 1) the recent political history of the state (in order to help 
frame the political context in which the agenda setting process takes 
place) , 2) the personal background of the governor, including his prior 
experience, style, and political philosophy, and 3) political factors, 
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Table 4: The Average Number of Vetoes Per Year By 
Divided or Unified Government in All States, 1990-1991 
Unified Government Divided Government 
Number of States 20 28 
1990 21.22 28.33 
1991 28.27 25 
Average 24.75 26.67 
Note : States not included are Nebraska (nonpartisan legislature) and 
North Carolina (no veto power) . 
Source : The Book of the States, 1945-1993 Editions . Lexington , Kentucky : 
Council of State Governments . 
including the electoral outcomes, the governor's party support, his 
relationship with the legislature, and his public support. All unattributed 
quotes are taken from interviews conducted by the author during the 
spring of 1994. This paper summarizes the findings of this research, 
linking personal and political factors in explaining each governor's 
agenda setting strategy. 
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Zell Miller : The Hands-On Governor 
Miller selects issues generally based on a realistic sense of 
what can and cannot be accomplished publicly and in the 
General Assembly. His knowledge of the General 
Assembly is a big factor here . Sometimes if you know you 
are going to do something that does not naturally coincide 
with the interests of some key committee, or the legislative 
leadership , you need to make a little more public noise. It 
is almost always based on a very painstaking member by 
member assessment of where key legislators are likely to 
be and what buttons to push . 
-Ed Kilgore, policy advisor to the governor 
Zell Miller has enjoyed having party support as an important 
source of political capital. As a professional politician, he knows how 
to work the legislative process as an insider. He is a goal-oriented, 
hands-on governor. Miller understands how to build a consensus, 
although his style is geared towards confrontation. 
In terms of selecting the items on his agenda, both major 
issues and specific policy alternatives, Miller is pragmatic. As Frank 
Bates, a policy advisor to the governor, explained, 
We try to do our homework and see which way the wind 
is blowing on a particular issue. If people are interested in 
crime, we do a poll to see what people want. We certainly 
want to give the people what they want . 
Miller is good at selecting policy alternatives that are popular 
among the public . Staff members explained that by picking issues that 
are popular with constituents, Miller has increased his support in the 
legislature. For example , in 1994 Miller decided to push "Two strikes 
and you're out," as opposed to the nationally proposed "Three strikes 
and you're out , " policy for sentencing violent offenders on his 1994 
agenda. According to Rick Dent , the governor's press secretary, 
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It is a nice little baseball analogy and everyone can 
understand it. That subject came up, and the governor 
said, and this is where he really thinks like real people, he 
said, 'You know, how do you explain that you are going to 
give a violent criminal three times to rape somebody? How 
do you justify giving somebody three times to molest 
children? I was raised by my mom who said everyone is 
entitled to a second chance, everybody makes mistakes, but 
not a third .' 
Miller tries to maximize success by developing his agenda 
incrementally. For example, on the lottery issue, achieving success 
meant postponing until 1992 the enabling legislation that would 
determine how the lottery would be run and how the money would be 
spent. Miller did not want to risk losing the lottery in a battle over 
how the funds would be used. In his first legislative session, the 
highest priority on his agenda was a constitutional amendment allowing 
the voters to decide whether or not there should be a Georgia lottery. 
As Ed Kilgore, a policy advisor to the governor , explained, "To a large 
extent, what he does this year has been predetermined by what he has 
done in previous years." Another example includes Miller ' s campaign 
pledge to build boot camps for nonviolent offenders. As Kilgore 
explained , 
If you '100k at that over his entire four years you 
will see a consistent pattern. Establishing boot camps made 
it possible this year to go after tougher mandatory sentences 
for the most violent repeat offenders. We've adopted two 
strikes and you're out. It all kind of fits together-ending 
the early release program, building prisons, providing boot 
camps, and then having the prison space available. 
Another important part of Miller's strategy has been to 
prioritize his issues. As Bates, a policy advisor to the governor, 
explained, 
There are a lot of issues that he has. You try to 
manage three or four key issues and try to do them well. 
If you take on a whole host of issues, you can't manage 
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them properly . He goes through a selection process. 
Whicb is most important? Which will bring more 
comfort to the people of this state? What do the people 
want most? We try to push those particular issues. He has 
learned to take on issues that are most important to the 
people of this state and do them well, instead of taking on 
a whole armful and not being able to manage them as well. 
As journalist Tom Baxter explained, "In terms of what he will 
go to the wall for, you only have to look at legislative records to see 
that he has really focused on a few things." According to 
Representative Bob Holmes (D), 
He's a master at agenda setting. He has a knack of taking 
one or two issues that are really going to be his primary 
thrust and that's what he tends to concentrate on, which I 
think is a much more effective way than to have a 
Christmas list, so to speak, of a dozen different issues. 
That way, on an education issue like the lottery, he can 
put more capital working to try to get that and maybe one 
or two other issues. So I would say he is very good at 
that; in focusing his efforts he's able to accomplish a great 
deal more . 
Once Miller decides what he wants to do, he is forceful about 
getting what he wants. As Steve Wrigley, the governor's executive 
secretary, described, "He lays it down very clearly, 'This is my 
agenda, this is what I want, and this is how I want you to help me do 
it.'" The governor appears to have a great deal of influence, and he 
understands the legislative process. As Wrigley explained, 
The legislative body has 236 members, and you might have 
that many separate agendas. If the chief executive strikes 
off in a direction that makes sense from a policy 
standpoint-if it is politically popular, makes sense to the 
members, and it's clear what he is trying to achieve-then 
he '11 get it. Miller understands that it is really a 
communication issue. 
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Miller is very effective at "standing tall," providing leadership 
and direction to the legislature. 
According to Representative Bob Holmes (D), Miller "is very 
aggressive and very assertive. I bate to say this, but he sort of has a 
'take no prisoners' kind of attitude. To a certain extent he is almost 
too inflexible." For example, Miller was very confrontational in 
proposing to change the state flag. As Frank Bates, a policy advisor 
to the governor, explained, "If he always tried to do what was 
politically correct, he would not have touched trying to change the 
flag." Miller bad a strategic reason for pursuing the flag issue. Not 
only was he appealing to a national audience, but he used the flag issue 
on the one band to balance welfare reform on the other. As 
Representative Bob Holmes explained, "I think he wanted to show 
conservatives that he was willing to do something on welfare reform, 
and he wanted to show liberals that he wanted to do something in terms 
of a social issue like the flag." 
According to journalist Tom Baxter, "He probably hurt himself 
politically more than he thought he would." Miller pushed the issue in 
1993, admitted that he bad failed, and moved on to other issues. He 
remained committed to the idea of changing the state flag; however, 
other priorities needed his attention. In addition to the flag, Miller has 
bad to fight for DUI legislation and welfare reform. As Cynthia 
Wright, legal counsel to the governor, explained, Miller has pushed 
some tough issues, and "even though we've bad a Democratic majority 
and we've enjoyed that, it is not a bed of roses around here." 
Miller governs using a carrot and a stick, and as party 
chairman, there are a number of sources of leverage that he can use 
over legislators. As a professional politician, Miller knows when to be 
confrontational without risking his chances of success. The tremendous 
amount of party support that he has, combined with his political skills 
and experience, help to explain his "inside" strategy and his 
confrontational style. In sum, the presence of unified government has 
been an advantage for Miller. 
Ned McWherter: The Speaker as Governor 
To understand McWherter you need to begin by 
understanding that he is a product of the legislature. 
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Because he was a product of the legislature, he brought to 
the governor's office a belief that the executive branch 
should establish a small number of priorities, work to 
implement those priorities, and for the most part leave the 
remainder of the issues to the legislature without the 
governor's interference . 
-Billy Stair, executive assistant for policy and planning 
Ned McWberter's basic philosophy is that a governor should 
focus on a few things and do them well. While there are legislators 
who probably want the governor to take on more issues, McWherter 
has tried to maintain his focus. As Billy Stair, the governor's executive 
assistant for policy and planning, explained, 
We don't go down there and take a position on every bill. 
There are a whole range of issues like whether you can 
have an open beer in a car, or whether people can legally 
be permitted to carry guns, or smoking in government 
offices. We don't care about those issues because they do 
not, in our opinion, relate to that big picture of economic 
development in Tennessee. We let the legislature do their 
thing, and they've been supportive of letting the governor 
do his thing. It's worked . 
McWherter chose to focus on a limited number of priorities, 
because, as he explained, "If you don't prioritize your issues, you'll 
end up trying to do everything and won't accomplish a great deal." As 
Betty Haynes, the governor ' s chief administrative officer, described, 
"Governor McWberter does not like to get sidetracked." In describing 
his philosophy, McWherter explained, 
I govern with my eyes focused on the basic needs of 
Tennesseans, to improve the quality of life through a better 
education and a health care system, and to get people jobs . 
I keep my target out there in front of me all of the time. 
I've got two philosophies : plan your work, and work your 
plan. 
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McWberter's style is inclusive; he works with the legislature 
in developing his agenda. He likes to "ease along," slowly developing 
a consensus on each issue. He keeps legislators informed, meeting 
one-on-one with them, and bouncing ideas around to build a consensus 
before he takes a public stand. He is the classic example of 
Rosenthal's "legislative" governor. Once McWberter formally 
proposes an initiative, be defers to the legislature , asking legislators to 
refine and perfect his proposal. As Representative H. E. Bittle (R) 
described McWberter's strategy, "He's left a lot of the major decisions 
up to the legislature. Like education reform. He endorsed it and 
promoted it. But the package he presented to us, we changed and 
improved, with his encouragement." Ken Renner , the governor's press 
secretary, explained, "We had to do certain things to build consensus. 
When we began talking about education reform, we watered a lot of the 
ideas on it to come from the ground up. " As David Gregory , the 
governor's director of legislative affairs, described the process, 
It was a coalition type deal where you had Republicans and 
Democrats alike in working hard . They took the bill that 
we introduced in the legislature, hammered out amendment 
and amendment, worked on it this way and that and truly 
made it a better bill than we had put in. But it was able to 
pass in a way that people felt like they had a chance to 
participate . Everybody was happy . 
McWberter was able to build a consensus by developing the 
issue incrementally. As Renner explained, "We wanted to improve 
teacher salaries early on, realizing that he had to do that before we 
could get the teachers' approval for other improvements outside of 
salaries." Likewise, McWberter ensured that more prisons were built 
before proposing "Three Strikes and You're Out" in 1994. So in 
selecting specific policy alternatives, McWberter has been pragmatic . 
Overall, McWberter's strategy has been to maximize his 
strengths by focusing on the legislature. In setting the agenda, his 
instinct has always been to go to the legislature before going to the 
public . As Ken Renner , the governor's press secretary explained, 
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My instinct is to get a lot of public support first before 
going to the legislature; his instinct is the exact opposite. 
He will go directly to them. Often on a major policy, like 
education reform or health care reform, we will schedule 
a speech to the legislature to try to set the tone for 
the issue and how it is framed. Then we will follow with 
a lot of information to the legislature and to the media. His 
style has always been to go first to the legislature. 
As Representative H. E. Bittle (R) explained, "He's used the legislature 
because he understands how it works. He knows how to reach 
consensus. I think his understanding of the system and working the 
system to the maximum to his advantage have served him well." Jim 
Kennedy, deputy to the governor, agreed: "He is a consensus builder . 
You can sail against the wind, but it ~oesn't really work that way." 
McWherter's prior experience as Speaker of the House for 14 
years has aided him tremendously in his role as consensus builder. Not 
only did he acquire a unique perspective on the long term development 
of the issues, but he understands who the major players are . 
McWherter also has a number of long-time friends in the legislature, 
and many of the current leaders were put in place when McWherter 
was in the legislature. As a professional politician, McWherter is 
skilled at bringing together opposing factions from both parties. 
Unified government has been an advantage for McWherter. 
He has enjoyed the security of a substantial amount of support from his 
party, which has also allowed him to maximize his strengths. 
According to Ken Renner, the governor's press secretary, 
Management is really his strong suit. He knows the 
numbers, he knows the details, he's been in state 
government so long that he can sit down with a 
commissioner and ask him not only how a program is 
doing, but how Joe is doing in that program . His strong 
suit isn't going on television and giving great speeches and 
that kind of thing. What we have tried to do is to 
maximize his strengths, to find out what he does best and 
build his administration or style around doing what he does 
best. You can't completely hide from the public and be a 
manager down in the bowels of state government 
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A long time back on first grade report cards there was a 
little spot on the back, 'he plays well with other children.' 
Well, when you get in politics , and in a leadership position, 
that remark is the first thing-lesson 101- in working 
government to an ultimate end. Governor Fordice actually 
hired someone to help him with 101, because of his 
completely different background. So he has changed . He 
was just too bold; he made remarks to start with that were 
unnecessary . After he toned that down, he was able to 
work better with the legislature . 
Fordice was reluctant to become involved in the legislative 
process. He outlined hls agenda in hls state of the state address and 
expected the legislators to come up with bills that reflected hls agenda. 
As Jody Tidwell, administrative assistant to the lieutenant governor, 
described Fordice 's style, "He leads by example. He's not a leader 
who gets down there and works with you; he's a man that leads by 
example and with a strong hand." Geoffrey Yoste, policy advisor to 
the governor, agreed: "He's kind of adversarial at times. 'This is how 
we're going to do this and thls is how it is going to be.' He leads by 
example. He proposes and the legislature disposes." For the most 
part, Fordice chose to communicate with the legislature through hls 
staff, outlining goals but leaving the legislative process to the 
legislators. Fordice is a good example of Rosenthal's "executive" 
governor. He likes to keep hls relationshlps professional and prefers 
not to socialize with legislators. "He's there if they want to talk 
substance with rum. He wants to have a good relationshlp, but it's all 
business as opposed to just public relations," explained Geoffrey Yoste, 
a policy advisor to the governor. 
As a political amateur, Fordice needed time to develop an 
effective strategy. According to Andy Taggart, the governor's chlef 
of staff, 
He [Fordice] saw that simply presenting to the legislature 
what made perfect common sense to him and seemed to 
reflect the mandate of the voters wa~ not enough. We had 
legislators come into the governor's office waving 50 to 70 
pink slips of people who'd called. Those people didn't just 
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somewhere and expect to be successful, but you have to 
maximize your own ability to do those things that you do 
well. 
McWherter is a professional politician who understands the 
importance of personal relations in the legislative process. He goes out 
of his way to make the legislature an equal partner with the governor. 
Clearly, unified government has been an important source of political 
capital for the governor, contributing to his good relationship with the 
legislature . As a product of the legislature, he knows how to work the 
system and to build consensus. He keeps the legislature informed and 
always takes his recommendations to the legislature before taking a 
public stand. He has been inclusive and accessible in his style as a 
"legislative" governor. As a result of unified government, McWherter 
was able to capitalize on the skills he developed as Speaker in 
developing an agenda setting strategy that focused primarily on the 
legislature . 
Kirk Fordice: The Chief Executive Officer as Governor 
After six months Pordice got his 'sea legs.' Being a CEO 
of a state government and being a CEO of a private 
business are very different things. In his business he could 
say to one 'Go' and he went and to another 'Come' and she 
came. But government doesn't work that way. The give 
and take of the legislative process has caused him to grow 
immensely. 
-Andy Taggart, chief of staff 
Lacking prior political experience, as governor Kirk Fordice 
has drawn from what he learned in the business world. He entered 
office intending to run the state of Mississippi like a business. 
However, he soon realized that a CEO of state government is very 
different from a CEO of a business. Senator Walter Graham (D) used 
the analogy of a first grade report card to grade Fordice's performance: 
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rise up one day and decide to call their legislator. There 
was a hard network in place. Our goal is to have a true 
grass roots organization so that when a [Fordice-supported] 
bill is two days away from a vote next February, we can 
call our 20 people, who then call their chairmen, who then 
call their six or eight or ten precinct chairmen. 15 
Fordice realized that by going public, he could generate 
support for his agenda that would give him influence in the legislature. 
TEAMississippi, announced at the Neshoba County Fair in 1992, 
became the grassroots organization envisioned by the Fordice 
administration. 
The TEAMississippi organization set up a 1-800 number for 
citizens to call and receive information on who their legislators are, 
where to reach them , when the legislature is in session, and what issues 
are being debated. In addition, TEAMississippi provides a phone tree 
that can be activated in support of the governor's bills . The strategy 
was developed as a way to tap into the governor ' s public support, since 
Fordice did not feel that the media was a tool that he could rely on. 
As John Arledge , Fordice's Director of Communications, explained, 
"We have a very liberal newspaper here in Jackson and there has been 
a lot of tension between the governor 's office and this paper. So we 
can't exactly say we have some media buddies that are helping us push 
the governor's agenda." 
TEAMississippi provided a means to translate Fordice's public 
support into political capital . After announcing TEAMississippi in 
August of 1992, Fordice initially recruited about 7,000 people. By the 
1994 legislative session , there were more than 15,000 registered 
members. Once the TEAMississippi agenda is announced in August, 
the list is narrowed to a few issues that become the governor's 
priorities. As Andy Taggart, the governor ' s chief of staff, explained, 
We could not have realistically pursued 12 major 
subject areas and the three or four sub-items in each of 
those areas over the course of a 90 day session. 
We couldn't have devoted the resources , nor would we 
have given appropriate attention to the issues that were 
most important to us. So we broke the TEAMississippi 
agenda down into a much more practical listing so that the 
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governor could focus on three key issues each year.and 
that 's what we identified in the state of the state address. 
Fordice has learned that by focusing his agenda, he can maximize his 
potential for success. As John Arledge, the governor's director of 
communications, explained, "By announcing the agenda six months in 
advance of the legislative session, you really have time to work on it." 
Despite his minority party status as governor , staff members 
insisted that Fordice does not consider what the legislature is likely to 
pass when he decides on what to focus. According to John Arledge, 
the governor ' s director of communications, "It's not a big factor in his 
decisionmaking whether the legislature is for it or against something . 
And that is really part of his appeal; he ' s a very obstinate man. " For 
example, as Arledge explained , "We've pushed term limits all three 
times. We don't need any political feelers to tell us that the legislature 
will not pass term limits , but nonetheless, the governor sees that as a 
high prio rity and will continue to push on it. " Jeanne Forrester, a 
policy advisor to the governor, said that Fordice "does not consider the 
legislature's reaction, and I would say that there are a number of issues 
we end up fighting for. But the staff as a whole has gotten a lot more 
savvy about what works to move our agenda." As a reporter 
explained, "Fordice never would have gone with a tax cut , for 
example, if he wanted to pick something easy to pass . He knows what 
he wants, and he goes for it." 
Fordice is straightforward about what he wants ; he tries to 
keep legislators informed and to be accessible to them. He is 
committed and passionate about his ideas, but he does not tend to invest 
himself personally in pushing his agenda through the legislature. He 
becomes involved when he feels it is critically necessary; otherwise, he 
delegates the job to his legislative staff . The problem with Fordice ' s 
strategy, however , is that TEAMississippi is a set of very specific 
policy alternatives. For example, Fordice does not try to build support 
to "do something" in the area of education. He outlines proposals for 
local option public school choice , performance pay for teachers , and 
mandatory caps on administrative spending . In all five or six issue 
areas he addresses each year through TEAMississippi, he does not paint 
the big picture; he lays down the specific policy alternatives that he 
supports. While it is important that Fordice outlines his priorities, 
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by committing to specific alternatives at the agenda setting stage, not 
much room is left for compromise during later stages of the legislative 
process. Fordice demonstrates the dangers of what Kernell terms 
"posturing." 
Rosenthal describes the governors who are "executive types," 
explaining that "they stand on principle and are not reluctant to scrap 
with the legislature or go over the head of the legislature to the press 
and people·. "16 Lacking party support as a resource and frustrated 
after his first few months in office, Fordice went over the heads of 
legislators to make a direct appeal to the people for support. Through 
the establishment of TEAMississippi he developed a mechanism for 
tapping into his public support and articulating his agenda. As an 
amateur, Fordice has had to learn through trial and error how to deal 
with a legislature controlled by the opposite party . Although lie could 
potentially draw from a broader, ideological base of support, Fordice 
is not the type of governor who tries to build coalitions through 
constant compromise. Fordice is strong in his convictions and 
confrontational in his approach . In this case, the presence of divided 
government seems to have exacerbated the naturally adversarial 
relationship between the governor and the legislature in Mississippi. 
Carroll Campbell: The Salesman as Governor 
He's always looking for what fits his ideological agenda . 
That's probably the first screening . What does he, as a 
conservative Republican, need to say about a particular 
issue. Then he asks, well, is that good policy? Does it 
make sense? Can we afford it? How is it going to be 
received in the legislature and in the general public? A lot 
of it is trying to find the trains that are already moving . It 
is not that often that we originate an issue out of this 
office; normally it is something that has been bubbling up 
and is already being talked about. We try to figure out if 
it is important enough for him to include in his agenda. 
Cost is always a big consideration , but so is the public's 
perception . Once he says there is an issue that he thinks is 
important, we do a lot of research to figure out what the 
legislative leadership thinks about it, whether we are likely 
to get anywhere with it, what the press is going to say, all 
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those kinds of things . 
Janice Trawick, executive advisor for education 
As a professional politician Carroll Campbell understands the 
limits of his role in agenda setting and has attempted to select issues 
and focus on priorities that maximize his success. As governor, 
Campbell has demonstrated an acute awareness of and sensitivity to 
politic al capital and how it is expended. Campbell believed that the 
issues he put on his agenda early in his term would define the limits of 
what he could do later in his term. As Tucker Eskew, the governor's 
press secretary, explained, 
We started out with a narrow election victory in 1986 and 
a Republican governor going into a traditionally Democratic 
legislature . There was a sense that there was a need to 
develop early political capital, focusing in the agenda and 
establishing some clear points of reference for people to say 
yes, Carroll Campbell is a go-getter, an achiever. 
For example, Campbell chose to focus on economic 
development because he could achieve success without necessarily 
going through the legislature. He used his experience as a successful 
businessman to become South Carolina's salesman. The strategy 
worked. As Graham Tew, a policy advisor to the governor, explained, 
"We were lucky in that he was able to deliver some good things in 
economic development, which gave him credibility." As Eskew 
elaborated, 
We bad a number of high-profile announcements of 
corporate locations and new investments into the state early 
in the first six to eight months in 1987-projects that the 
governor got involved with and helped bring to fruition 
very quickly. He bad campaigned largely on the issues of 
economic competitiveness and bow South Carolina needed 
to rewrite its tax code, reconsider its incentives, and focus 
more on diversification of our economy . He was able to 
follow up on that pledge in the campaign with early 
victories in economic development. 
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While there were some economic development initiatives that 
required legislation, Campbell's energies were focused on recruitment 
of industry. As Eskew explained, "We bad the legislature involved, 
but the higher profile activity of going out and recruiting industry and 
traveling the globe was seen as Carroll Campbell's activity." Graham 
Tew, a policy advisor to the governor, explained that a conscious 
decision was made not to define the governor's success in terms of 
legislation: 
We don't define ourselves simply by how much legislation 
we pass . We have had almost $20 billion of new 
investment in the state since Carroll Campbell became 
governor. That has been because he travels all around the 
county, all around the world, all through the state, tallcing 
expansion and bringing in new companies. 
By placing less emphasis on legislative achievements, 
Campbell attempted to prevent the legislature from defining whether he 
was successful or not. And by winning early successes in economic 
development, Campbell accrued capital that allowed him to expand his 
agenda. 
In choosing his priorities, Campbell tries to focus on 
substantive issues that will have the most impact on the future of South 
Carolina. As Campbell explained, 
I have expended capital on the things that I thought were 
important more from a 'macro ' standpoint of the future of 
the state as opposed to the 'micro' type of issue where it 
might involve an individual appointment or something like 
that. Most of them are broader issues that have to do with 
the whole state, not singular issues that are very isolated or 
controversial. 
According to Campbell, political capital is wasted on symbolic issues. 
For example, according to Mark Elam, the governor's senior executive 
legal counsel, Campbell would never touch an issue such as the 
changing the Confederate flag. As Campbell explained, 
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Sometimes the hottest issue that you find is the most 
controversial thing-a symbolic issue instead of a 
substantive issue. And people get all jacked up over 
symbolism, but I don't burn a lot of capital on symbolism. 
I get criticized sometimes for it. I could take on every 
symbolic fight that comes along, but in the end, you don't 
accomplish anything one way or another . I want to take on 
a substantive fight that really is going to mean something. 
Campbell becomes involved only on the issues of major 
importance to him, a strategy that maximizes his political capital within 
the legislature. As William Gunn, a policy advisor to the governor, 
explained, 
The legislarure recognizes that Carroll Campbell is not an 
individual who latches on to every issue and tries to push 
through every microscopic bill that goes across but be does 
become energetic about the important initiatives that are the 
framework of what be wants to do in bis administration. 
In Representative H. Howell Clybome's (R) description, "Campbell 
tends to move in bold, reform-oriented steps, and it is so 
comprehensive that it tends to span years." Campbell has been very 
careful to focus his energies behind a manageable set of priorities, 
maximizing his resources in order to obtain success on the issues that 
he considers most important. 
Campbell's strategy also involves going public. Because of 
divided government, party support in the legislature is insufficient to 
guarantee acceptance of Campbell's agenda. To gain additional 
influence and sell his agenda, Campbell has taken his message to the 
public. Campbell is an effective public speaker, a very polished and 
professional politician who understands the benefits of going public. 
Graham Tew, a policy advisor to the governor, explained how, saying, 
We always said we would go over the beads and go 
straight to the people, and we did that in a number of 
ways-the governor moving around the state and speaking 
directly to the people, lots of news conferences, lots of 
contact-a very, very focused press operation to mold 
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public opinion through the press . We had the best 
messenger in the state. We understood how to use the tools 
we had to communicate what we were about to the public, 
and that's how you build political capital. If you are 
popular with the public, that translates eventually 
back upstairs to the legislators, because they want to do 
what their constituents want them to do. 
If successful, a going public strategy will generate support within the 
legislature . As Representative David Wilkins (R) explained, 
He [Campbell) is very articulate and he is good in front of 
a camera . He uses those abilities to generate support for 
his beliefs and his issues, and that in turn can equate into 
support in the general population which legislators feel and 
which influences them to support his issues. I think he uses 
his ability to speak and his ability to get his message 
through the media to become very effective. I think that 
has been his most effective tool, probably more so than 
his ability to sit down one on one with people and work 
things out. He can sell his message to the people, and if 
you can do that, you ultimately get what you want. 
Campbell is also sensitive to the limitations of a going public 
strategy. When he does make an appeal to the public, he does not 
criticize the legislature, and he does not lock into a specific policy, 
leaving room on stage for legislators to have a part in the show. 
Campbell uses a going public strategy to facilitate opportunities for 
bargaining and compromise . 
Campbell understands the importance of making legislators feel 
like they are involved in the process. Campbell knows what he wants, 
but he does not try to force his agenda on them. He sets the direction 
and then allows the legislature to play a part in the final course. For 
example, while education has been on his agenda throughout his 
administration, he has framed the issue in terms of general goals and 
not specific programs. Thus, a Democratic legislature that had 
typically dominated this issue area was still included in the process. As 
a Columbia reporter explained, "At the outset he offers what he wants. 
He knows where he is willing to draw the line. He doesn't reveal that 
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in the beginning, but he knows what he is willing to give up to get 
what he wants." Representative H. Howell Clyborne (R) agreed, 
explaining that "once Campbel1 decides on what he thinks is the right 
thing to do , he goes with it. But he is very good at determining what 
the bottom line will be." 
Although Campbell has pursued an active agenda consistent 
with his conservative philosophy, legislators argue that certainly there 
were things Campbell did not even try because of divided government. 
Representative Clyborne explained, 
There continues to be a very definite philosophical 
difference between Democrats and Republicans . That 
does affect things . If you have a governor's mansion 
controlled by the same party, there's just not that 
check there . The effect is probably not quantitative, but it 
is a qualitative difference because there are a lot of 
perceptions about getting things through and who gets what 
passed. So a lot of times you may think about introducing 
something , but you know good and well that it is never 
going to pass . So to keep from being publicly defeated, 
you just don't introduce it. That's what the difference is. 
You temper what you put out based on the audience that is 
there. 
According to Graham Tew, a policy advisor to the governor, 
"If we had a Republican majority, we would have done a lot more on 
auto insurance reform, tort reform, and things of that nature." Mark 
Elam, the governor's senior legal counsel, also described the impact of 
divided government, saying, "Under divided government, you don't get 
everything you want. You have to make more compromises, you have 
to be much more cooperative, and it is not easy." Campbell is 
extreme ly sensitive to his political capital, and the process by which he 
selects issues would suggest that there are issues, or specific policies, 
that he chose not to pursue. Campbell is a professional politician who 
unders tands the limits of his role and the consequences of his actions. 
He care fully selected issues and focused on priorities that would 
maximiz e his success. And where he could, he attempted to address 
issues nonlegislatively . 
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Campbell' s strategy of agenda setting has been a combination 
of building capital, focusing his priorities, and using the bully pulpit to 
take his message to the public. He strategically chose a limited number 
of agenda items early in his term in order to maximize success. At the 
outset he is confrontational about the issues he thinks are important, but 
he always leaves room for consensus and compromise. 
Divided government has had a significant impact on 
Campbell's strategy. There was not a strong enough base of party 
support for Campbell to rely on, nor did he enter office with an 
electoral mandate to pursue a specific agenda. Therefore, Campbell 
had to create political capital. Capitalizing on his talents in public 
relations, Campbell took his message to the people. And drawing from 
his experience as a businessman, he became South Carolina's chief 
salesman. Campbell's success in these nonlegislative activities 
combined with his sustained public support ultimately gave his agenda 
credibility within the legislature. 
Conclusion 
By focusing on the state level, this study has tried to expand 
our understanding of the impact of divided government. Does divided 
government produce gridlock, or is there no discernible impact on the 
policymaking process? In applying the competing theories of the 
impact of divided government at the national level to the states, several 
issues were raised. First, the use of quantitative measures of the 
impact of divided government was found to be problematic. The focus 
on legislative outputs, such as the number of bills passed, masks the 
impact of divided government at earlier stages in the policy making 
process. If governors seek to maximize their success through 
anticipating the reactions of the legisiature, then there should be little 
or no difference in the number of bills passed by the legislature. This 
study first analyzed quantitative measures of outcomes under divided 
government at the state level similar to those used at the national level 
by Mayhew and Fiorina. It then shifted the focus to an earlier stage of 
the policy process , agenda setting , using a more qualitative approach. 
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Divided government helps to explain a governor's choice of 
strategy in agenda setting, influencing whether he will work primarily 
within the system or go public. However, a combination of other 
factors also affect the agenda setting process. Through the use of 
interviews, this study has been able to pinpoint the resources that 
governors in different political contexts consider important. 
According to Light's study of presidential agenda setting, 
political factors are the most important in agenda setting. In applying 
Light's theoretical framework at the state level, the key difference 
between governors in divided versus unified government is the amount 
and the source of their political capital. 
Table 5 summarizes the political capital of the four governors 
included in this study. The major difference between the governors is 
party support. The two governors from states with unified government, 
Miller (D-GA) and McWherter (D-TN), were both elected with 
overwhelming Democratic majorities in the state legislature. In 
contrast, the two governors from states with divided government, 
Fordice (R-MS) and Campbell (R-SC), were both elected with a small 
minority of the seats in the legislature held by their party . 
The governors also differ in the amount of public support each 
has had over time (See Table 5). In the states with unified 
government, Miller (D-GA) has had an average of 45 % positive 
approval rating and McWherter (D-TN) has had an average of 50%. 
In contrast, both governor's from divided government have sustained 
higher positive approval ratings. Fordice's average approval rating has 
been 56%, with a high of72 %, and Campbell's has been 64%, with a 
high of 7 5 % . Realizing that they did not have a base of party support 
to rely on, both the governors from divided government states have 
tried to use public support to increase their influence. Their 
substantially higher approval ratings reflect the efforts that they have 
made to cultivate public support. 
Differences in the source and amount of political capital help 
to explain the strategies the four governors have used in agenda setting. 
In setting the agenda, governors tend to emphasize one of two basic 
strategies: 1) working inside the system, appealing to party members 
for support, or 2) working outside the system, basically going over the 
heads of legislators to the public for support. To maximize success, 
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Table 5: The Political Capital of Selected Governors 
Prior Experience Electoral Outcome 
Zell Miller (D-GA) 
1991-1994 
Academic, Business governor won 53% 
GAU Gov., 1974-1990 80% Dem. maj. in House 
83% Dern. maj. in Senate 
Ned McWherter (D-TN) 
1987-1994 
Kirk Fordice (R-MS) 
1992-1995 
Business 
TN House, 1969-1986 
(Speaker, 1972-1986) 
Business 
Carroll Campbell (D-SC) Business 
1987-1994 SC House, 1970-1974 
SC Senate, 1976-1978 
U.S. House, 1978-1986 
Source: Compiled by author 
governor won 54 % 
63% Dem. maj. in House 
70% Dem. rnaj. in Senate 
governor won 51 % 
15% Rep. min. in House 
17% Rep. min. in Senate 
governor won 51 % 
26% Rep. min. in House 
20% Rep. min. in Senate 
Public Support 
(Average) 
45% 
high 54% 
low40% 
50% 
high64% 
low40% 
56% 
high 72% 
low42% 
64% 
high 75% 
low59% 
governors will employ both strategi es. Going public is not necessarily 
incompatible with bargaining. However, whether or not there is 
divided government influence s which of the two strategies will be the 
primary focus of the governor. In this study , the two governor s under 
unified government have relied on the first strategy , while the two 
governor s under divided government have emphasized the second 
strategy. 
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The strategy a governor uses, whether he will make primarily 
a party appeal or a public appeal, depends on the major source of his 
political capital. While certainly all governors appeal to both their 
party and the public for support, when the governor's party controls 
only a small minority of the seats within the legislature, public support 
takes on a much greater importance. Conversely, when the governor 
has substantial party support, public support is important, but not as 
necessary. 
In addition to the basic type of strategy that a governor will 
use in agenda setting, governors have different styles. The styles range 
from confrontational to conciliatory and reflect the governor's 
personality and background to a greater extent than the political context 
of divided or unified government. In the two states with unified 
government, both McWherter and Miller have extensive prior 'political 
experience and have used the same strategy of pursuing an agenda that 
attracts their party support. Yet these two governors have very 
different styles. Miller tends to be confrontational. He sets his agenda 
and then pressures legislators to support him. He pursues issues that 
have both legislative and public support, so he can afford to be 
confrontational without jeopardizing his party support. On the other 
hand, McWherter tends to be very conciliatory. He has mastered the 
art of consensus building and avoids confrontation whenever possible. 
For the most part, he only pursues issues that have developed enough 
support to achieve success. 
In the states with divided government, Campbell and Fordice 
have both pursued going public strategies. However, their styles are 
also very different. As a professional politician, Campbell understands 
when he needs to be confrontational and when he needs to be 
conciliatory. He believes that as a Republican governor in a 
Democratic state, he has to be somewhat confrontational. But in the 
end, Campbell is always willing to work with Democrats and 
compromise to achieve his goals. In contrast, as an amateur politician, 
Fordice has been more confrontational in his approach. He is less 
willing to compromise and even appears somewhat frustrated by the 
political process. He has learned while serving as governor, however, 
and over time his style has become more similar to that of Campbell. 
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In conclu sion , although divided government does not produce 
gridlock or stalemate at the state level , it is not without impact on 
governing . Divided government affects the strategy that a governor 
uses in setting the agenda . With party support as a source of political 
capital , a governor is likely to work within the legislature and appeal 
to his party for support . Without party support to count on, a governor 
is likely to put more emphasis on obtaining public support for his 
agenda. Whether a governor is more conciliatory or confrontational, 
however , reflects his personality and his prior experience. 
Gubernatorial agenda setting is best explained by the interaction 
between a variety of personal and political factors. 
Laura van Assendelft is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at 
Mary Baldwin College. Her research interests in state and local 
politics focus on the impact of divided government on policymaking. 
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